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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 12-2581
_____________
ROBIN L. CARTER,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
District Court No. 1-07-cv-00816
District Judge: The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet

Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 14, 2013
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: January 18, 2013)
_____________________
OPINION
_____________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Robin Carter appeals from the judgment of the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware, which affirmed the final order of the Commissioner of
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Social Security denying Carter’s application for supplemental security income
(SSI) benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. The District Court
exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291. Our review is limited. We review to determine whether there is
substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s final decision.

42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Substantial evidence “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales,
402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We
exercise plenary review with regard to any legal issues. Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 2012).
Carter applied for SSI benefits in June of 2004, alleging the onset of
disability in March of 2002. After a hearing, the administrative law judge (ALJ)
concluded that Carter had several medical impairments that limited her ability to
perform basic work activities. These impairments included “osteoarthritis, carpal
tunnel syndrome, cervical disc herniation, right shoulder degenerative joint
disease, bilateral degenerative joint disease of the knees, degenerative joint disease
of the left ankle, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, dysthymia, borderline
intellectual functioning, and a personality disorder.” The ALJ determined that the
limitations caused by these impairments, though severe, did not meet or equal the
criteria of any of the impairments listed in Appendix 1 for which a finding of
2

disability is presumed. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(iii) (referencing 20 C.F.R.
Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1). Because these limitations precluded Carter from
performing her past relevant work, the ALJ heard testimony from a vocational
expert regarding the jobs that existed in the national economy for an individual
with similar restrictions. After considering the medical evidence of record, as well
as the testimony of Carter, her mother, her boyfriend, and the vocational expert, the
ALJ determined that Carter was not disabled for purposes of SSI.
Carter sought judicial review of this determination, asserting that the ALJ
erred in several respects.

The District Court did not find Carter’s arguments

persuasive and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner.
Thereafter, Carter filed a timely motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,
seeking to alter the judgment.

The motion was denied.

This timely appeal

followed.
Carter’s principal contention is that the ALJ failed to accord proper weight
to the opinions of her treating physician, Dr. Al-Junaidi, and a consultative
psychiatrist, Dr. Chester.

She relies on a statement in a progress note dated

October 31, 2005 by Dr. Al-Junaidi indicating that she was “unable to work,” and
the consultative report of Dr. Chester, a psychiatrist, who opined that her current
GAF score in November of 2004, as well as during the previous year, was only
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45. 1 In Carter’s view, both of these opinions support her disability claim and the
ALJ erred by failing to explain his reasons for rejecting this medical evidence.
We are mindful that the report of a treating physician “should be accorded
great weight,” especially when that physician’s treatment records or opinion
“reflect expert judgment based on a continuing observation of the patient’s
condition over a prolonged period of time.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 429
(3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). After reviewing the
record, we conclude that the ALJ followed this directive, according great weight to
Dr. Al-Junaidi’s treatment records by finding that Carter was limited to sedentary
work with certain postural and environmental limitations. The ALJ appropriately
discounted Dr. Al-Junaidi’s statement that she was unable to work because his
progress notes failed to provide support for that statement. Indeed, Dr. Al-Junaidi
documented on several occasions that his physical examination revealed neither
atrophy nor weakness of any muscle group. Dr. Al-Junaidi observed that Carter’s
gait was normal and her joints were intact.

1

GAF is an acronym which refers to an individual’s score on the Global
Assessment of Functioning Scale. Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 32 (4th ed. Text Revision 2000). The scale
is used to report the “clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of
functioning” in light of his psychological, social and occupational limitations. Id.
The GAF ratings range from 1 to 100. A score of 45 is indicative of “serious
symptoms . . . OR any serious impairment in social, occupational, or school
functioning (e.g., no friends, unable to keep a job).” Id. at 34.
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We also reject Carter’s assertion that the ALJ did not explain his basis for
discounting Dr. Chester’s opinion, which preceded Carter’s affliction with
pancreatitis and prompted her to abstain from alcohol. The ALJ credited the
medical evidence of Carter’s attack of pancreatitis and the evidence that she had
ceased drinking, specifically noting that Carter was “not . . . using alcohol.” He
further found that in the absence of alcohol abuse Carter did not have any
“significant functional limitations” as a result of alcohol abuse. This provides a
reasoned basis for according less weight to Dr. Chester’s medical opinion, which
was rendered when Carter was alcohol dependent. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429
(recognizing that contradictory medical evidence may be a basis for an ALJ to
conclude that a physician’s medical opinion is not controlling). Furthermore, after
considering this finding regarding Carter’s mental abilities, it is readily apparent
why the ALJ did not discuss Carter’s GAF scores when she was dependent upon
alcohol.
We have considered Carter’s other arguments and, substantially for the
reasons set forth in the District Court’s Memoranda, do not find them persuasive.
Moreover, we find no merit in Carter’s suggestion that the subsequent award of
SSI benefits beginning December 7, 2007, demonstrates that the ALJ erred and
that she is entitled to benefits. Without more, the notice of the award fails to
establish that the disability determination was based on medical evidence
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pertaining to the period for which benefits were denied. See Szubak v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 745 F.2d 831, 833 (3d Cir. 1984) (instructing that
subsequent evidence must “relate to the time period for which benefits were
denied” before it is considered relevant to the claimant’s application for disability).
Accordingly, because the final decision of the Commissioner is supported by
substantial evidence, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
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